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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act ("VWPA") or the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ("MVRA") applies to the 
imposition of restitution in sentencing a defendant who 
committed his offenses prior to the effective date of the 
statute but is convicted on or after its effective date. The 
District Court found that although Edwards had no present 
ability to pay restitution, full restitution should be imposed 
under the MVRA. Edwards timely appealed to this court. 
Both sides now agree that the District Court incorrectly 
applied the MVRA to Edwards, and that the Victim and 
Witness Protection Act (VWPA) should have been applied.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Appellant did not specifically argue that the VWPA, not the MVRA 
applied, but did contend that the District Court should have made 
findings regarding his financial ability to pay before ordering 
restitution. 
This finding is necessary only for cases under the VWPA. 18 U.S.C. 
SS 3663, 3664. 
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We hold that the application of the MVRA to Edwards 
constitutes a violation of the ex post facto prohibition, and 
we accordingly reverse and remand for a determination of 
whether restitution is appropriate for Edwards under the 
VWPA. 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
Between December of 1992 and October of 1993, 
Edwards was involved in various schemes involving 
counterfeit checks, forged commercial checks, and stolen 
travelers' checks. PSI P 1. Edwards was sentenced on 
December 23, 1997, after pleading guilty to one count of 
conspiracy, one count of bank fraud, seven counts of 
money laundering, and one count of criminal forfeiture. 
Potential monetary penalties included a fine range of 
$12,500 to $5,000,000, restitution of $418,397.15, and a 
special assessment of $500. PSI P 77, 81. The probation 
office's review of Edwards's liabilities and assets indicated 
that he had children to support, did not own property or 
appear to have any assets of note, and had a total liability 
of $92,854 of debts owed to credit card companies and 
banks. PSI PP 61-68. 
 
At sentencing, defense counsel argued that Edwards did 
not have the ability to pay restitution, while the government 
contended that restitution was mandatory for his offenses 
under the MVRA. The district judge found that although the 
defendant did not have the present ability to pay 
restitution, the MVRA required restitution and ordered full 
restitution in the amount of $418,397.15. (A. at 14, 16, 22).2 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. S 3742. As the ex post facto argument was 
not raised before the District Court, plain error review 
applies. See United States v. Dozier, 119 F.3d 239, 241 (3d 
Cir. 1997). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. At sentencing, the Assistant United States Attorney indicated to the 
District Court that Edwards' offenses required mandatory restitution. No 
issue of an ex post facto prohibition was raised by counsel or the court. 
A. at 22. Recently, the Justice Department has apparently adopted a 
policy that the MVRA should not be applied to offenses predating its 
enactment. Gov't Br. at 6. 
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II. The MVRA and the VWPA 
 
In 1996, Congress passed the MVRA, or "Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act of 1996," Title II, Subtitle A of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, codified in relevant part at 
18 U.S.C. SS 3663A, 3664 (1996). The MVRA became 
effective April 24, 1996, to the extent its application is 
constitutionally permissible. See 18 U.S.C. S 2248 (statutory 
notes). The MVRA makes restitution mandatory for 
particular crimes, including those offenses which involve 
fraud or deceit. See 18 U.S.C. S 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii). If the 
MVRA applies to a defendant, a court must order 
restitution to each victim in the full amount of that victim's 
losses, and the court cannot consider the defendant's 
economic circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. S 3664(f)(1)(A). 
While the MVRA clearly applies to convictions on or after its 
effective date, its applicability to offenses committed before 
that date is at issue here. See 18 U.S.C.S 2248 (statutory 
notes). 
 
The prior restitution statute, the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act, or "VWPA," requires the court to consider 
the economic circumstances of the defendant prior to 
ordering restitution. In this Circuit, a District Court has to 
make certain factual findings before ordering restitution 
under the VWPA: 1) the amount of the loss sustained by 
the victims; 2) the defendant's ability to pay that loss; and 
3) how the amount of restitution imposed relates to any 
loss caused by the conduct underlying the offense(s) at 
issue. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Davis , 43 F.3d 
41, 47 (3d Cir. 1994). Under the VWPA, an indigent 
defendant can be made to pay restitution, but the court 
must tailor its findings to a defendant's potential assets or 
earning capacity. Id. 
 
Neither side contests the fact that Edwards's crimes fall 
under S 3663A if the MVRA applies to him. If the VWPA 
applies to Edwards, however, the District Court erred by 
failing to make the required factual findings prior to 
imposing restitution. In order to determine which statute 
applies, we must determine the constitutionality of applying 
the MVRA to a defendant whose criminal conduct occurred 
prior to the effective date of the statute. 
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III. Ex Post Facto Analysis 
 
To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be 
1) retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring 
before its enactment; and 2) it must disadvantage the 
offender affected by it by altering the definition of criminal 
conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime. See 
Lynce v. Mathis, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 891, 896 (1997). 
The MVRA would be retrospective as applied to Edwards, 
and it disadvantages him by holding him accountable for 
the full amount of restitution, when under the VWPA, he 
would, in all likelihood, not be held accountable for the full 
amount. The question then is whether the MVRA altered 
the definition of criminal conduct or increased the 
punishment for Edwards's crimes. The MVRA did not alter 
the definition of Edwards's criminal conduct, but it did alter 
his fiscal responsibility for its consequences, and we must 
determine whether, in so doing, it increased the 
punishment for his crimes. 
 
Most of the Courts of Appeals that have considered this 
question have found that the retrospective application of 
the MVRA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because 
restitution imposed as part of a defendant's sentence is 
criminal punishment, not a civil sanction, and the shift 
from discretionary to mandatory restitution increases the 
punishment meted out to a particular defendant. See 
United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256, 1259-1261 (11th 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Bapack, 129 F.3d 1320, 1327 
n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Williams , 128 F.3d 
1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Baggett, et al., 
125 F.3d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Thompson, 113 F.3d 13, 14 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997); but see 
United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 
In Williams, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
viewed the express language of the MVRA as making clear 
that mandatory restitution was a "penalty," and hence, 
punishment for the purposes of ex post facto analysis. 128 
F.3d at 1241.3 In Siegel, the Court of Appeals for the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 3663A(a)(1) provides: 
 
       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a 
       defendant convicted of an offense [listed under this section] the 
       court shall order, in addition to, or in the case of a misdemeanor, 
       in addition to or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by law, 
that 
       the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense . . . . 
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Eleventh Circuit focused on the language of S 3663A(a)(1) 
describing restitution as a "penalty" and its own precedents 
characterizing restitution as a criminal penalty to conclude 
that restitution under the MVRA should be considered a 
criminal penalty, and that the retroactive imposition of the 
full amount of restitution would violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. See 153 F.3d at 1259-60.4  The Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, in Baggett, focused not so much on the 
punitive character of restitution, but on the change in 
procedure for determining a defendant's responsibility for 
restitution under the MVRA--from the VWPA procedure of 
analyzing the defendant's financial circumstances before 
determining the amount of restitution paid, to the MVRA's 
procedure of ordering full restitution without considering 
the defendant's economic circumstances--to find that the 
retroactive application of the MVRA violated the Ex Post 
Facto Clause. See id. at 1322. 
 
Of the Circuits that have considered this question, only 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in United 
States v. Newman, has determined that the retroactive 
imposition of restitution under the MVRA does not violate 
the Ex Post Facto Clause. In Newman, the court conceded 
that the retroactive application of the MVRA would 
disadvantage a defendant whose conduct occurred prior to 
its effective date, but the court stated that since restitution 
was essentially a civil penalty, and not punishment, the ex 
post facto prohibition did not apply. See 144 F.3d at 538.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Other Circuits have rejected the retroactive application of the MVRA 
outright. See Bapack, 129 F.3d at 1327 n.13 (indicating that the 
retroactive application of the MVRA would raise ex post facto concerns); 
Thompson, 113 F.3d at 15 n.1 (concurring in the parties' agreement that 
the retrospective application of the MVRA would be an ex post facto 
violation). 
 
5. In so finding, the Newman court relied on Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 
S. Ct. 2072 (1997) and Hudson v. United States , 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997) 
to determine whether restitution can be considered punishment. The 
Seventh Circuit used the analysis set forth in Hudson to determine 
whether restitution is, in fact, punishment: First, a court must first ask 
whether the legislature, in establishing the "penalizing mechanism, 
indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference" for a criminal or 
civil 
penalty. Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493. Second, if the legislature indicates 
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In so finding, the Newman court first looked to the 
historical character of restitution as an equitable device, 
and opined that restitution serves more as a form of 
individual remedy than a criminal sanction. Id.  Along these 
lines, the Newman court stated that restitution serves to 
"ensure that a wrongdoer does not procure any benefit 
through his conduct at others' expense. . . . The criminal 
law may impose punishments on behalf of all of society, but 
the equitable payments of restitution in this context inure 
only to the specific victims of a defendant's criminal 
conduct and do not possess a similarly punitive character." 
Id. at 538 (citations omitted). 
 
In addition to surveying the historical characteristics of 
restitution as a remedy, the Newman court also noted that 
it had observed "the non-punitive character of restitution in 
prior cases." Id. at 538-39 (citing cases). It did note, 
however, that "our view of restitution is not universally 
shared." Id. at 539 n.7 (citing cases, including United States 
v. Sleight, 808 F.2d 1012, 1020 (3d Cir. 1987)). The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
an intention to establish a civil penalty, a court must then inquire 
whether the statutory scheme was so punitive in either purpose or effect 
so as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil penalty into a 
criminal penalty. Id. In determining whether a statutory scheme could be 
so transformed, the Court set forth a multifactor analysis, and 
emphasized that the factors had to be considered in relation to the face 
of the statute in question and that only "the clearest proof " will 
suffice 
to override legislative intent. Id. 
 
Our Circuit has used a somewhat different formulation from that set 
forth in Hudson, namely, that a measure must pass a three-prong test: 
1) actual purpose; 2) objective purpose; and 3) effect, to constitute non- 
punishment. See Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1263 (3d 
Cir. 1996). If the legislature intends a particular measure to be 
"punishment," or if retribution was one of its actual purposes, then it 
must fail constitutional scrutiny; if, however, the" `restriction of the 
individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation,' " the 
measure must be further analyzed. See id. The continued viability of 
Artway is arguably in doubt in the wake of recent Supreme Court 
precedent, but we need not reach the question here in light of the 
relative clarity of both the statutory language and legislative purpose of 
the MVRA. See, e.g., Hudson, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. at 493 & n. 4; E.B. 
v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1093-94 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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Newman court also looked to the statutory language of the 
MVRA and took issue with the Williams court's reading of 
the plain language of the MVRA; instead, the court found 
the MVRA's statutory scheme to be ambiguous as to the 
"criminal" or "civil" nature of the penalty assessed under 
S 3663A. See 144 F.3d at 539. After further review of the 
historical character of restitution and general 
characteristics of restitution as a remedy, the Newman 
court concluded that the ambiguities found in the statute, 
combined with the traditionally non-punitive character of 
restitution, warranted a finding that restitution should be 
considered a civil, rather than a criminal penalty, and that 
the retroactive imposition of restitution under the MVRA 
would not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See id. at 539- 
40. 
 
We find that the majority view of the Courts of Appeal is 
the better view. Both the statutory scheme and the 
legislative history of the MVRA point toward a 
determination that restitution should be considered a form 
of punishment under the statute. Section 3663A and 
related provisions indicate that restitution is a criminal 
penalty under the MVRA, as it is imposed as an integral 
and necessary part of sentencing, supervised release, and 
probation for the crimes it implicates. 18 U.S.C.SS 3556, 
3563(a)(6)(A), 3563(b)(2), 3565, 3663A, 3664. Even if we 
were mistaken as to the nature of the statutory scheme 
itself, the legislative history of the MVRA leads to the same 
conclusion. The legislative history indicates that Congress 
intended mandatory restitution to be one means by which 
the criminal justice system could be reformed into a system 
that is more responsive to the needs of crime victims, as 
mandatory restitution forces an individual defendant to 
address the harm his crime has caused to the individual 
victims of his crime and to society. See S. Rep. 104-179, 
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 925-26, 930-31; see also  H. Rep. 
104-16, reported at 1995 WL 43586 (Feb. 2, 1995), at 5-6, 
10; 142 Cong. Rec. H3606 (daily ed., April 18, 1996); 141 
Cong. Rec. S19278, S19280 (daily ed., Dec. 22, 1995); 
Mandatory Victim Restitution: Hearing on S. 173 Before the 
Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States Senate , 104th 
Cong. 805 (1995) (statements of Senators Biden, Grassley, 
and Nickles). In so stating, the legislative history also 
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evinces a Congressional intent to streamline the 
administration of restitution within the criminal justice 
system; to make mandatory restitution under the MVRA a 
penalty separate from civil remedies available to the victims 
of crime; and to caution that the administration of 
mandatory criminal restitution should not take on the 
procedural complications of civil proceedings--in other 
words, to ensure that restitution under the MVRA is a form 
of criminal penalty rather than civil redress. See S. Rep. 
104-179, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 931-34; see also  141 Cong. 
Rec. S19278, S19281 (daily ed., Dec. 22, 1995). Moreover, 
the legislative history also indicates that mandatory 
restitution should be considered a condition of a 
defendant's supervised release and probation. See S. Rep. 
104-179, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 927, 929; H. Rep. 104-16, 
1995 WL 43586 at 5, 12. Both the language and the history 
of the MVRA convince us that Congress intended the 
restitution it mandated to be a form of criminal 
punishment. 
 
Further, this finding is consistent with our precedents 
stating views regarding restitution for criminal defendants. 
We previously have indicated that restitution is a form of 
criminal penalty. See United States v. Sleight,  808 F.2d 
1012, 1020 (3d Cir. 1987) ("While one purpose of 
restitution under the Federal Probation Act is to make the 
victim whole, restitution . . . is imposed as a part of 
sentencing and remains inherently a criminal penalty."); 
United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 478-79 (3d Cir. 
1985) (finding that restitution imposed under the VWPA is 
a criminal penalty, and distinguishing its imposition under 
the VWPA from a civil proceeding in which restitution is 
imposed).6 We have also noted that while criminal 
restitution resembles a civil remedy and has compensatory 
as well as punitive aspects, neither these resemblances to 
civil judgments, nor the compensatory purposes of criminal 
restitution, detract from its status as a form of criminal 
penalty when imposed as an integral part of sentencing. 
See United States v. Woods, 986 F.2d 669, 680-81 (3d Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We also note the retributive aspect of a statutory modification 
mandating payment of restitution regardless of the defendant's means 
based solely on the nature of the crime. 
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1993); United States v. Kress, 944 F.2d 155, 157-59 (3d 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Pollak, 844 F.2d 145, 152-53 
(3d Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Carrara, 49 F.3d 
105, 108 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing the historical character 
and purposes of restitution in criminal law); Government of 
Virgin Islands v. Davis, 43 F.3d 41, 47 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(describing the compensatory purposes of restitution under 
the VWPA). 
 
Based on the foregoing, we find that under the MVRA, 
restitution is punishment, and that the retrospective 
application of that punishment to Edwards under the facts 
of this case is a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause and 
plain error.7 Accordingly, we will reverse the imposition of 
mandatory restitution and remand for the District Court to 
make the appropriate factual findings and determination of 
restitution under the VWPA for Edwards. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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7. We have little difficulty concluding that the violation of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause in this case was plain error based on the analysis and 
holding we set forth in United States v. Dozier, 119 F.3d at 244-45. 
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